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Abstract
In this paper, we study the impact of a merger to monopoly on prices and investments. Two
single-product firms compete in prices and coverage for a new technology. In equilibrium, one
firm covers a larger territory than its competitor with the new technology, leading to single-
product and multi-product zones, and sets a higher uniform price. If the firms merge, the merged
entity can set different prices and coverage for the two products. We find that the merger raises
prices and total coverage, but reduces the coverage of the multi-product zone. We also show
that the merger can increase total welfare and consumer welfare.
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1 Introduction
In a number of recent merger cases in Europe among mobile network operators, the potential impact
of mergers on investment has been hotly debated.1 Operators claim that mergers in the sector can
have a positive effect on investment, while the European Commission has expressed the view that
mergers are detrimental to innovation absent efficiency gains.2
In this paper, we develop a simple model where a merger to monopoly raises total investment
despite the absence of synergies. We consider a coverage-price game, where two firms decide on
prices and coverage of a new technology over a territory.3 When firms are separate, one firm covers
a larger share of the territory than its rival. When a merger-to-monopoly takes place, the merged
entity raises all prices, increases total coverage with a positive effect on welfare, and reduces coverage
∗We are grateful to Yassine Lefouili, Simon Loertscher, Massimo Motta, Volker Nocke, Patrick Rey, Tim Simcoe
and Tommaso Valletti for very useful discussions and comments. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of
the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme
(grant agreement No 670494).
†Telecom ParisTech; marc.bourreau@telecom-paristech.fr.
‡Toulouse School of Economics, CNRS; bruno.jullien@tse-fr.eu.
1See, for example, the European Commission decision on the Hutchison 3G/Orange merger case in Austria,
COMP/M.6497 (December 2012).
2Genakos et al. (2017) provide evidence that concentration in the mobile market may indeed imply a trade-off
between prices and investments. Based on panel data for the period 2002-2014 covering 33 countries from Europe and
the OECD, they find that a 4-to-3 merger raises prices by 16% on average, but at the same time increases investments
by operator by 19%. However, the evidence of a positive effect of mergers on investment is not totally conclusive,
since they find that total investment is not affected significantly by the merger.
3In the telecommunication industry, roll-out of duplicated infrastructures occurs for mobile 4G and FTTH (for
instance, in France and in Spain).
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for the multi-product zone, which can either harm welfare (due to lower variety) or increase it (due
to the business-stealing effect). We provide an example where total welfare and consumer surplus
can increase with the merger.
Our paper is related to the broad literature on competition and innovation (see Gilbert (2006)
for a recent survey). This literature has considered different measures of competition,4 but sur-
prisingly very few papers have considered mergers (see the discussion by Shapiro (2012)). Motta
and Tarantino (2017) argue that absent spillovers or synergies, the reduction of output by the
merged entity induces a reduction of cost-reducing investment. Federico et al. (2017a) argue in the
context of a symmetric race for a new product that internalization by the merged firm of canni-
balization of sales by simultaneous innovations leads to a reduction of innovation effort.5 Denicolò
and Polo (2017) show however that their conclusion holds only if the R&D technology exhibits
sufficient decreasing returns to scale, and that the reverse holds otherwise. We identify a new effect
that explains a positive impact of mergers on innovative investment. Other articles pointing to
different channels which may lead to such a positive effect are Marshall and Para (2017), in the
context of a dynamic model of leadership, and Loertscher and Marx (2017), in a model with buyer
power.6 Our paper also builds on the literature on universal service in network industries, which
focuses on regulatory issues (see, among others, Valletti et al., 2002; Hoernig, 2006; Gautier and
Wauthy, 2010).
The model is presented in Section 2 and analyzed in Section 3. All the proofs are in Appendix.
2 Model
Consider a geographic market represented by a half-line from 0 to z¯. Two operators, 1 and 2,
deploy a new technology. Initially, the market is not covered at all and there is no alternative
old-generation technology. The two operators have the same development cost c (x) to deploy the
technology in location x, where c (x) is increasing. We define as
C (z) =
∫ z
0
c (x) dx
the total cost of covering the locations from 0 to z. We assume that c (0) is small enough and
limx→z¯ c (x) is large enough so that in a duopoly both firms invest and no firm covers the whole
market (see footnote 7). We also assume that firm i = 1, 2 deploys the technology in all locations
x ≤ zi where z1 ≥ z2.
The operators offer differentiated products, with product i designating firm i = 1, 2’s product.
In each location x, the single-product monopoly demand (for product 1) is Ds (p1), while the multi-
product demand is D1 (p1, p2) for product 1 and D2 (p2, p1) for product 2. We normalize the firms’
(constant) marginal cost of production to 0.
We adopt the linear demand model of Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984). The utility of
the representative consumer is given by
U(q1, q2,m) = α (q1 + q2)− 1
2
(q21 + q
2
2)− γq1q2 +m,
where m is the numeraire good and γ ∈ [0, 1) represents the degree of substitutability between
products 1 and 2. The products are unrelated if γ = 0 and become perfect substitutes when γ → 1.
In the paper we will assume that γ ≤ 0.73 to ensure the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
4See, for example, Vives (2008) for a theoretical analysis.
5Federico et al. (2017b) develop a more general model, allowing for pre- as well as post-innovation competition.
6Davidson and Ferrett (2007) and Motta and Tarantino (2017) argue that sufficient synergies may stimulate
post-merger investment.
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If both goods 1 and 2 are available to the consumer, utility maximization yields the following
multi–product demands for firms 1 and 2 (provided that quantities are positive),
D1(p1, p2) =
α− p1 − γ (α− p2)
1− γ2 and D2(p1, p2) =
α− p2 − γ (α− p1)
1− γ2 .
If only good 1 is available, the single-product demand for this good is
Ds(p1) = α− p1.
For future use, we define the single-product monopoly price and the multi-product duopoly
price as
pm =
α
2
and pd = α
1− γ
2− γ ,
respectively.
We follow Motta and Tarantino (2017) in considering that pricing occurs before investment
decisions are publicly observed. We thus study a coverage-price game, where firms decide simul-
taneously on a coverage zi for the technology and on a price pi charged uniformly in all covered
locations, with i = 1, 2. In the absence of merger, firm 1 and firm 2 are single-product firms. In
the case of a merger, the merged entity offers the two products, 1 and 2, with potentially different
coverage.
3 Analysis
We first determine the equilibrium of the coverage-price game without merger, and then with the
merger. We finally compare the two equilibria to analyze the impact of a merger to monopoly on
prices, coverage, and social welfare.
3.1 Without merger
Without a merger, firms 1 and 2 compete in coverage and prices.7 Assuming that z1 ≥ z2, firm 2 is
competing on all its covered territory and faces the demand z2D2 (p2, p1) over all locations, while
firm 1 faces competition only on part of its territory, as it is the sole seller on all locations between
z2 and z1, and faces the demand z2D1 (p1, p2) + (z1 − z2)Ds (p1). Firms’ profits are then given by
Π1 = z2p1D1 (p1, p2) + (z1 − z2) p1Ds (p1)− C (z1) , (1)
for firm 1, and
Π2 = z2p2D2 (p1, p2)− C (z2) (2)
for firm 2.
Clearly, the pricing decision of firm 2 is the same as in the standard multi-product duopoly
game, leading to the best-reply
p2 = BR (p1) =
α+ γ (p1 − α)
2
. (3)
7For an interior solution, we assume that c (0) < α2 (1− γ) / (2− γ)2 (1 + γ) and c (z¯) > α2/4.
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Firm 1 sets a uniform price for all its covered territory, balancing the revenue from the single-
product part of it, where it faces no competition, and the revenue from the multi-product part,
where it competes with firm 2. We find that:
p1 = BR1 (p2, z1, z2) =
α+ θγ (p2 − α)
2
, (4)
where
θ ≡
z2
z1−z2
1−γ2
1 +
z2
z1−z2
1−γ2
∈ [0, 1) .
Thus, the larger the coverage by firm 2, the closer is p1 to the duopoly best-reply price.
Considering the choice of coverage by the two firms, we first notice that (see Appendix), because
expanding coverage yields higher returns for locations above z2 (single-product) than below z2
(multi-product), there is no equilibrium with symmetric coverage.
With a smaller coverage, firm 2 trades off the investment cost with the revenue of additional
coverage in the multi-product zone. The equilibrium coverage for firm 2 is then the solution of
c(z2) = p2D2(p1, p2). (5)
Firm 1, however, takes into account the difference in revenue between the single-product and
multi-product zones. As the multi-product zone is infra-marginal, the marginal return on coverage
is given by its profit in single-product locations, which yields:
c(z1) = p1Ds(p1). (6)
We then obtain:
Proposition 1 Under separation and sufficient product differentiation, a unique pure strategy
equilibrium exists with zS1 > z
S
2 and p
d < pS2 < p
S
1 < p
m.
The firm with the largest coverage trades off between charging a high price to exploit its market
power in single-product locations, and charging a low price to compete with its rival in multi-
product locations. It thus sets a price in between its multi-product best-reply and the single-
product monopoly price pm, which is higher than the price set by the firm with a lower coverage.
By strategic complementarity, both firms then set a price that is higher than the multi-product
duopoly price pd. Formally, prices and coverage levels are:
c
(
zS1
)
= pS1
(
α− pS1
)
=
α2 (2 + θγ) [2− θγ (1 + γ)]
(4− θγ2)2 (7)
and
c
(
zS2
)
= pS2D2(p
S
1 , p
S
2 ) =
(
α
2− γ − θγ2
4− θγ2
)2
1
1− γ2 , (8)
with θ = θ
(
zS1 , z
S
2
)
.
4
3.2 Merger-to-monopoly
If firms 1 and 2 merge, the merged entity has two products, 1 and 2, for which it can decide on
different coverage levels. Assume that product 1 has a larger coverage, that is, z1 ≥ z2. Given
coverage z1 and z2 and prices p1 and p2 for products 1 and 2, respectively, the firm’s profits are:
Π = (z1 − z2)p1Ds(p1) + z2 [p1D1(p1, p2) + p2D2(p1, p2)]− C(z1)− C(z2).
We find that the profit-maximizing prices are pM1 = p
M
2 = p
m = α/2. The equilibrium coverage
levels for products 1 and 2 are then given by
c
(
zM1
)
= pim =
α2
4
, c
(
zM2
)
= max
{(
1− γ
1 + γ
)
pim, c (0)
}
.
The following proposition summarizes this analysis.
Proposition 2 The merged firm sets pM1 = p
M
2 = p
m, and 0 ≤ zM2 < zM1 = c−1 (pim).
As product substitutability decreases, the firm expands the range where it offers both products,
while still offering only one product in the more costly locations.
3.3 Impact of merger on prices, coverage, and social welfare
We can now compare the equilibrium with and without the merger, in terms of prices and coverage.
Proposition 3 A merger to monopoly raises prices and total coverage, and reduces the coverage
of the multi-product zone.
Thus, a merger to monopoly has a priori an ambiguous effect on social welfare. On the one
hand, it leads to higher prices as expected. On the other, it raises the incentives to invest in total
coverage. The multi-product coverage is however lower with the merger, and therefore there are
locations where consumers lose the benefit from a larger variety of products.
Let us define welfare in a location x, denoted by w, as the sum of firms’ profits (pii) and consumer
surplus (cs) in the location.
Without the merger, total equilibrium welfare is
WS = zS1w
s(pS1 )− C(zS1 ) + zS2
(
wd(pS1 , p
S
2 )− ws(pS1 )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− C(zS2 ),
whereas if the firms merge, total welfare is
WM = zM1 w
s(pm)− C(zM1 ) + zM2
(
wd(pm, pm)− ws(pm)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−C(zM2 ).
The impact of the merger on total welfare is thus given by the difference:
WM −WS = (zM1 − zS1 )ws(pm)−
(
C(zM1 )− C(zS1 )
)
+(zM2 − zS2 )
(
wd(pm, pm)− ws(pm)
)
− (C(zM2 )− C(zS2 ))
− (zS1 − zS2 ) (ws(pS1 )− ws(pm))− zS2 (wd(pS1 , pS2 )− wd(pm, pm)) .
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The first term corresponds to the positive8 welfare gain from the total coverage expansion allowed
by the merger, evaluated at constant prices. The second term corresponds to the effect of the
reduction of the multi-product zone (again evaluated at constant prices). This term may be positive
or negative depending on whether the incremental social value of the second product is smaller or
larger than the incremental profit from it. Indeed, due to a standard business stealing effect (see
Tirole, 1988), there may be excessive coverage by firm 2 in the duopoly game.9
Finally, the last line subsumes the traditional negative effect of the merger on prices in both
regions, holding coverage constant.
To summarize, the merger expands total coverage, but has a negative impact on prices and
variety. It has a positive effect on welfare if the expansion of total coverage is large enough and/or
variety is excessive. We provide below a specific example where the merger leads to higher welfare.10
Proposition 4 Suppose that C (z) = c log [(β + ez) / (1 + β)] and γ < 0.73. Then, a merger raises
total welfare if c is not too high and β is not too small.
Figure 1 shows the area where a merger raises welfare (i.e., WM > WS) in the {γ, c} space,
for α = β = 1 and our specific cost function.11 This area corresponds to cases where, due to the
low degree of differentiation: (i) competition between firms decreases total coverage substantially;
(ii) the business stealing effect is strong. For consumers, we find that the set of parameter values
such that consumer surplus increases with the merger is smaller but also non empty.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.80.73
γ0.25
0.26
0.27
c
WM < WS
WM > WSCSM > CSS
Figure 1: Impact of merger on total welfare and consumer surplus (α = β = 1).
8It is positive because ws(pm) > c
(
zM1
)
= pim ≥ c (z) for z ≤ zM1 .
9While wd(pm, pm)−ws(pm) > c(zM2 ), it may be the case that wd(pm, pm)−ws(pm) < c(zS2 ), so this term cannot
be signed.
10We ran simulations with alternative cost functions. Welfare was systematically lower with the merger for the
following cost functions: (i) c(z) = czβ ; and (ii) c(z) = c log(1+βz). With the cost functions (iii) c(z) = czβ/(1+zβ),
and (iv) c(z) = βc(ez − 1)/((1 + β)(ez + β), we found similar results than the one given in the proposition.
11Since pim = α2/4 = 1/4, our assumption c(0) < pim < c(∞) implies that c ∈ (1/4, 1/2).
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4 Conclusion
In the recent Dow/Dupont decision,12 the European Commission discussing the impact of mergers
on innovation stated that “the effect of a less intense product market competition on innovation is
potentially ambiguous.” While our model aims at explaining the scale of adoption of a new technol-
ogy, the effect identified should apply to a more general setup with demand-enhancing investment.
Our paper thus illustrates one channel through which a merger may have a positive effect on in-
novation: by raising equilibrium margins, a merger raises incentives to invest to expand demand.
In a merger case involving investment and/or innovation, this positive effect on the incentives to
invest has to be balanced with other countervailing effects, either related to the restriction of out-
put induced by a merger for any given demand and costs (Motta and Tarantino, 2017) or to the
internalization of the business stealing effect associated with product innovation (Federico et al.,
2017).
A lot remains to be done to understand the interplay of these effects. To quote the current
European Commission’s Chief Competition Economist, “There’s a lot of policy work, but there’s
very little explicit theoretical work about this. There’s a huge body of research on the relationship
between concentration and innovation, and on the relationship between market integration and
innovation, but when it comes specifically to mergers and innovation, there’s much less.”13 Hence,
a global analysis that would help authorities identifying circumstances under which a merger fosters
or impedes investment remains to be done.
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Appendix
Lemma 1 There is no equilibrium with symmetric coverage.
Proof. With symmetric coverage z1 = z2 = z, we have p1 = p2 = pd = α(1− γ)/(2− γ) and
pdD1
(
pd, pd
)
< pdDs
(
pd
)
,
implying that the right derivative of Π1 in z1 is strictly larger than its left derivative. As a conse-
quence, if an equilibrium exists, it must be such that z1 > z2.
Proof of Proposition 1. Solving the first-order conditions (3) and (4) for the equilibrium prices
P1 (θ) and P2 (θ), we find that for given coverage z1 and z2:
P1 (θ) = α
(
2− θγ − θγ2
4− θγ2
)
and P2 (θ) = α
(
2− γ − θγ2
4− θγ2
)
. (9)
Plugging the equilibrium prices into the demand functions, we obtain:
D1(P1, P2) =
α
(
2− 2γ − γ2 + θγ)
(1− γ2) (4− θγ2) and D2(P1, P2) =
α
(
2− γ − θγ2)
(1− γ2) (4− θγ2) . (10)
We have D2(P1, P2) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈ [0, 1), while D1(P1, P2) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [0, 1]
requires that 2 − 2γ − γ2 ≥ 0, which is true since γ ≤ 0.73 under our assumptions. For higher
values of γ, that is, if the products are sufficiently homogenous, firm 1 has an incentive to retreat
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on its single-product area by setting a high (monopoly) price. In this case, an equilibrium in pure
strategy may fail to exist (see Valletti et al. (2002) and Gautier and Wauthy (2010) for details on
this case).
The equilibrium prices P1 (θ) and P2 (θ) satisfy the following properties: (i) Pi (θ) is decreasing;
(ii) P1 (0) = pm; (iii) P2 (0) = BR (pm) < pm; and (iv) P1 (1) = P2 (1) = pd. Moreover, the relative
price of product 1 decreases with the relative coverage of product 1, i.e., with θ.
The first-order conditions for the coverage levels, (5) and (6), can then be rewritten as (we
discuss the second-order conditions below):
c (z1) = P1 (θ)Ds (P1 (θ)) ,
c (z2) = P2 (θ)D2 (P1 (θ) , P2 (θ)) .
These two equations define positive coverage levels Z1 (θ) and Z2 (θ), for θ ∈ [0, 1], both de-
creasing in θ. Since Z1 (θ) > Z2 (θ), Z2 (0) > 0 and Z2 (1) > 0, we have
Z2(0)
Z1(0)−Z2(0)
1
1−γ2
1 + Z2(0)Z1(0)−Z2(0)
1
1−γ2
> 0 and
Z2(1)
Z1(1)−Z2(1)
1
1−γ2
1 + Z2(1)Z1(1)−Z2(1)
1
1−γ2
< 1.
Hence, there exists θ ∈ (0, 1) such that
Z2(θ)
Z1(θ)−Z2(θ)
1
1−γ2
1 + Z2(θ)Z1(θ)−Z2(θ)
1
1−γ2
= θ.
We thus have shown the existence of a solution to the system of first-order conditions, (3)-(6).
To prove that this is an equilibrium, we now exhibit conditions for the profit function of each
firm to be quasi-concave.
Consider first firm 2. Its profit function, which is given by (2), is concave in price. Thus,
its profit can be written as Π2 (z2) = z2maxp2 p2D2 (p1, p2) − C (z2), with a second derivative
Π′′2 (z2) = −c′ (z2) < 0. Hence, firm 2’s profit function is quasi-concave.
Consider now firm 1’s profit, which can be written as
Π1 (z1) = max
p1
{z2p1D1 (p1, p2) + (z1 − z2) p1Ds (p1)} − C (z1) .
We have
Π′1 (z1) = p1Ds (p1)− c (z1) ,
with p1 = BR1 (p2, z1, z2). The second derivative can then be written as:
Π′′1 (z1) =
(
p1D
′
s (p1) +Ds (p1)
) ∂BR1 (p2, z1, z2)
∂z1
− c′ (z1)
= (α− 2p1) γ
2
(α− p2)
(
1− γ2) z2
[z1 (1− γ2) + z2γ2]2
− c′ (z1) .
We look for a sufficient condition for the second derivative to be negative, therefore we look for
an upper bound for Π′′1 (z1). Since pi ≥ pd, we have (α− 2p1) (α− p2) ≤ α2γ/(2−γ)2. Furthermore,
since z1 ≥ z2, we have
z2
[z1 (1− γ2) + z2γ2]2
≤ 1
z2
.
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Therefore, a sufficient condition for Π′′1 (z1) ≤ 0 is that
1
2
α2γ2
(
1− γ2)
(2− γ)2z2 ≤ c
′ (z1) .
Finally, we have z1 > z2 ≥ c−1
(
pdD2
(
pd, pd
))
= c−1
(
pid
)
, where pid ≡ α2(1−γ)/((2− γ)2 (1 + γ))
represents the multi-product duopoly profit. Therefore, we have Π′′1 (z1) ≤ 0 if
1
2
α2γ2
(
1− γ2)
(2− γ)2c−1 (pid) ≤ c
′
(
c−1
(
pid
))
.
This condition can be written as
1
2
γ2 (1 + γ)2 ≤ c
′ (c−1 (pid)) c−1 (pid)
pid
,
which holds for γ ≤ 0.73 if at x = c−1 (pid) we have:
0.79746 ≤ c
′ (x)x
c (x)
.
Finally, since in equilibrium θ ∈ (0, 1), then pd < P2 (θ) < P1 (θ) < pm. Furthermore, θ > 0
implies that zS1 > z
S
2 .
Proof of Proposition 3. Taking the firm’s profits gross of investment costs and dividing by
z1 − z2, the firm sets its prices p1 and p2 to maximize
p1 (α− p1) + z2
z1 − z2
{
p1
(
α− p1 − γ (α− p2)
1− γ2
)
+ p2
(
α− p2 − γ (α− p1)
1− γ2
)}
.
From Propositions 1 and 2, we have pSi < p
m = pMi . Furthermore, since the right-hand side of (7)
is decreasing in θ and θ
(
zS1 , z
S
2
)
> 0, we have c
(
zS1
)
< c
(
zM1
)
= pim. Therefore, total coverage
increases with the merger. Finally, note that the right-hand side of (8) is decreasing in θ, hence, it
is minimum at θ = 1. We find that(
α
2− γ − γ2
4− γ2
)2
1
1− γ2 ≥
(
1− γ
1 + γ
)
pim,
and hence zS2 ≥ zM2 .
Proof of Proposition 4. In the case of a merger, we have prices pM1 = p
M
2 = α/2 and quantities
qsM1 =
α
2
and qdM1 = q
dM
2 =
α
2
1
1 + γ
,
leading to a point-wise welfare ws(pm) = 3α2/8 for the single-product zone and wd(pm, pm) =
3α2/ [4(1 + γ)] for the multi-product zone. The single-product and multi-product coverage are then
given by
zM1 = c
−1
(
α2
4
)
,
zM2 = c
−1
(
α2
4
1− γ
1 + γ
)
if
c
1 + β
<
α2
4
1− γ
1 + γ
and zM2 = 0 otherwise,
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where c−1 (y) = log (βy/(c− y)).
Consider now the case of separation. Equilibrium prices and quantities in the multi-product
zone are given by equations (9) and (10), where θ is endogenous. The quantity in the single-product
zone is
qs1 = α− pS1 = α
(
2 + θγ
4− θγ2
)
.
Finally, the single-product and multi-product coverage are given by
c
(
zS1
)
=
α2 (2 + θγ) [2− θγ (1 + γ)]
(4− θγ2)2
and
c
(
zS2
)
= α2
(
2− γ − θγ2)2
(4− θγ2)2
1
1− γ2 ,
respectively, with c (z) = c/(1 + βe−z).
From the definition of θ, we have
zS2
zS1
=
θ
(
1− γ2)
1− θγ2 .
Combining these three equations leads to the following condition for θ:
c−1
(
α2
(
2−γ−θγ2)2
(4−θγ2)2
1
1−γ2
)
c−1
(
α2(2+θγ)[2−θγ(1+γ)]
(4−θγ2)2
) = θ (1− γ2)
1− θγ2 .
This allows to compute numerically all equilibrium quantities.
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